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ADDING CONFUSION TO THE MUDDY WATERS OF THE OSWEGO LAKE DECISION:
A RESPONSE TO DEAN HUFFMAN
By
Michael C. Blumm* & Ryan J. Roberts**
Dean Jim Huffman’s recent article in Environmental Law on the Oswego Lake decision
claims that the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion is a “confused treatise on the public trust doctrine.”
Objecting to the court’s decision on a number of grounds, Dean Huffman took issue with the court’s
recognition of public access rights, its creation of a so-called “public use” doctrine, its use of the
law of private trusts, and its recognition of the state’s claim of ownership of water within its
jurisdiction. Moreover, and somewhat astonishingly, Huffman claims that the rights of the people
cannot be violated by the representatives of the people, seemingly at odds with over a century of case
law. Although we agree with a few of Huffman’s criticisms, he overlooks some critical public trust
interpretations of the Oswego Lake court, such as its recognition of the trustee status of
municipalities. He also confuses other issues, like the state’s distinction between what it calls
“navigable-in-fact” waters (those which support recreational watercraft today) and those
waterways that are navigable under the federal title test (commercially navigable around the time of
statehood). We explain both our agreements and criticisms in this essay.
*

*

*

Our friend, former colleague, and dean, Jim Huffman, well known as the Darth Vader of the
public trust doctrine,1 dashed off a comment on the Oswego Lake decision2 while an article of ours
was in press without our knowledge.3 We use this space to respond to Jim because while we agree
with him that Oregon Supreme Court’s decision is problematic, several of his criticisms are wide of

*Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. Thanks to Mary Wood,
Greg Adams, Todd Prager, and Kathleen Blumm for comments.
** J.D. Candidate 2021, Lewis and Clark Law School.
1
See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of
the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 597 n.108 (1989) (describing Huffman as the “Darth Vader of the
public trust doctrine.”)
2
James L. Huffman, Oregon Supreme Court Muddies the Waters: Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 50 ENVTL.
L. 455 (2020). Jim is perhaps the most frequent and longstanding critic of the doctrine, as evident in some of
his many writings which his article references. See, e.g., id. at 456 nn. 4−19; 460 nn. 33−34; 466 n. 71; 468
n. 89; 473 n. 114. For a review of some of his scholarship, see Michael C. Blumm, The Water Law Scholarship
of Jim Huffman and Janet Neuman: Prologue to the Festschrift, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 2−6 (2012).
3
Michael C. Blumm & Ryan J. Roberts, Oregon’s Amphibious Public Trust Doctrine: The Oswego Lake
Decision, 50 ENVTL. L. no. 4 (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (manuscript at 22−23 nn. 108−115) [hereafter
Oregon’s Amphibious PTD], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003.
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the mark, the comment has important omissions, and a number of its statements are inaccurate.
First, we agree with Jim that the so-called “public use” doctrine, which the court distinguished
from the public trust doctrine, has little to recommend it, as there is no functional difference between
the two doctrines in terms of the public’s right to use waterways.4 Since Jim’s project has been to
argue that the public trust doctrine is merely a public easement for navigation and fishing, he does
not see the need for a “public use” doctrine recognized as an easement. While we agree, we do not
share his view that the public trust doctrine is simply a public access easement; it also is an inherent
limit on sovereignty that imposes a fiduciary obligation to protect trust resources from “substantial
impairment.”5 This aspect of the public property right is not an access easement but is instead akin
to a restrictive servitude. In his effort to narrow the scope of the doctrine, Huffman does not
recognize its existence as a limitation on government.
Nor, as Jim suggests, is the public trust doctrine limited to navigation and fishing. For over a
century, courts have expanded the scope of trust resources to include recreational uses,6 such as those
at issue in the Oswego Lake case. Environmental preservation has been a trust purpose for nearly a
half-century.7 So, Huffman’s objection to the “public use” doctrine is a product of mischaracterizing
the scope of the public trust doctrine.

Our objection, on the other hand, is based the fact that the

“public use” doctrine apparently relieves the state of its fiduciary obligations, contravening the very
essence of the trust in holding government officials accountable to the citizenry.8 In fact, in the

4

Huffman, supra note 2, at 463−67. Cf. For our criticism of the court’s ratification of the public use doctrine,
see Oregon’s Amphibious Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 3, at 22−23 nn. 108−115).
5
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 931−932 (Pa. 2017). See infra note 29.
6
The seminal case is Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Wisc. 1893), whose reasoning was adopted by the
Oregon Supreme Court in Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437 (Or. 1918).
7
The pathbreaking case was Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
8
See Oregon’s Amphibious PTD, supra note 4, at text accompanying notes nn. 116−120.
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Oswego Lake case, the state denied any obligation to protect public access at all.9
Second, we also agree with Huffman’s claim that the public trust doctrine is not limited to
waterbodies whose beds are owned by the state.10 The interaction of private ownership of submerged
(and/or submersible) lands and public trust property rights held by citizens over such lands should
have been made clear as long ago as the 1918 Guilliams decision, which upheld public’s right to use
waterways overlying privately owned streambeds.11 Huffman criticized the Oswego Lake court for
creating this unnecessary linkage, but it was actually not a creation of that court. Instead, it was the
product of the 2005 Attorney General’s opinion that invented the “public use” doctrine, although the
court never acknowledged that it was merely affirming the Attorney General’s misguided opinion.12
So, we agree with Huffman’s criticism but think he should have recognized the origin of what Jim
views as a problem.13

9

See id. at text accompanying nn. 9, 51.
Huffman, supra note 2, at 460 (disagreeing with the Oswego Lake court that the source of the public trust
doctrine is derivative of state ownership of submerged lands); id at 462 (comparing the public trust doctrine to
an easement in which a transfer of ownership of the servient estate does not extinguish the easement and also
asserting that “sovereign title to submerged lands beneath navigable waters was a product of the preexisting
right of public use in those waters” which serves as a prima facie rule of original title but not necessary for
the continued existence of public rights).
11
Guilliams, 175 P. at 442, reinforced by Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1936).
12
Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 8281 (2005), 2005 WL 1079391 (Or. A.G.) [hereinafter 2005 AG Opinion]. The 2005
opinion is examined in some detail in Michael C. Blumm & Erica A. Doot, Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine:
Public Rights in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENVTL. L. 375, 382−86 (2012). The state’s interest in
creating an entirely novel doctrine was an effort to eliminate its fiduciary obligations for waterways whose
beds were privately owned. See supra notes 8−9; Oregon’s Amphibious PTD, supra note 4, at text
accompanying nn. 108−115.
13
Also confusing is Jim’s statement that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s opinion, the public will have a
right of access to Oswego Lake if the lake is “navigable in fact at the time of statehood.” Huffman, supra note
2, at 472. This assertion conflates the term “navigable in fact” with the test for navigability under the federal
rule for title, a distinction central to the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision. See Oregon’s Amphibious PTD,
supra note 4, at text accompanying n.110. Oswego Lake is clearly “navigable in fact” under state law, giving
the public a right to swim and boat on the lake if there is public access to the lake under Guilliams and similar
cases, as explained in the 2005 Attorney General’s opinion. See 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 12, at 24
(explaining that “navigable in fact” waters are those suitable for recreational watercraft). According to the
Oswego Lake court, the public trust right of access across public uplands is a function of whether Oswego
Lake was navigable under the federal title test at or around the time of statehood. Kramer v. City of Lake
Oswego, 446 P.3d 1, 12 (Or. 2019).
10
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Our criticisms of Huffman’s comment begin with his failure to mention a groundbreaking
decision of the Oswego Lake opinion.

He overlooked the court’s ruling that municipalities as well

as the state are trustees, subject to trust obligations.14 Moreover, he mischaracterized another
groundbreaking ruling that interpreted the trust to apply to public uplands adjacent to navigable
waters as a misinterpretation of standard riparian rights law.15 In fact, the court later clarified that
its decision was not intended to interpret riparian rights law.16
Another error of the Huffman comment is its singular focus on the court’s opinion, obscuring
the role that other branches of state government have played in recognizing public rights. For example,
he not only failed to recognize that the 2005 Attorney General opinion was the origin of the “public
use” doctrine, he seemed to suggest that the state’s claim of ownership of water is questionable.17
This assertion ignored the longstanding declaration by the state, dating to the 1909 Water Code, that
the state owned “[a]ll water within the State from all sources of water belongs to the public.”18 Public
ownership of resources evokes public rights. The Oswego Lake court recognized that the public
ownership of water, no less than the state’s ownership of wildlife, implicated the public trust

14

Kramer, 446 P.3d at 19.
Huffman, supra note 2, at 475−76.
16
Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 455 P.3d 922, 924 (Or. 2019) (“Because ownership of the riparian rights
remains a circumstance in dispute, it would be premature for us to resolve whether that circumstance has
relevance to plaintiffs' claim for relief.”)
17
Huffman, supra note 2, at 465, 474.
18
The 1909 Water Code, Act of Feb. 24, 1909, Or. L. ch. 221, p. 370 §1 (1909), codified in, OR. REV. STAT.
§537.110 (2020).
15
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doctrine.19 Even the state has acknowledged that public ownership of water is in trust.20 Huffman’s
questioning of public ownership of water is clearly inconsistent with state law.
Perhaps our chief criticism of Huffman’s comment is his unwillingness to acknowledge that
the law can and should evolve. His commitment to judicial activism in the name of the Takings
Clause may explain his deep skepticism of doctrines which could threaten a vitalization of
compensation requirements due to regulations.21 Still, Huffman does not object to the evolution of
the public trust doctrine from tidal waters to inland waters in the 19th century.22 Nevertheless, he
finds the evolution of the public trust to recreation and ecological protection objectionable. In
discussing Sax’s articles, he even suggested that any judicial influence the articles had would be
inconsistent with stare decisis, “unsupported by the common law and therefore beyond the authority
of the courts.”23 Why the evolution of public rights in the 19th century was satisfactory but not its
evolution in the 20th century, Jim never explains. He does not even seem to recognize that the

19

Kramer, 446 P.3d at 12 n.12. Jim suggests that the public trust in wildlife, recognized by the Supreme Court
in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), was reversed in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
While Hughes did reverse Geer on whether state ownership of wildlife could insulate a state from the scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause (or other federal prerogatives), the decision has not prevented at least 48 states
from claiming the existence of a wildlife trust under state law. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The
Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437 (2013). As Justice Brennan wrote in his opinion for the
Court in Hughes, “the whole [state] ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource. And there is no necessary conflict between that vital policy
consideration and the constitutional command that the State exercise that power . . . so as not to discriminate
without reason against citizens of other States.” Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334.
20
The State acknowledged in Chernaik v. Brown that “title navigable” waterways themselves—not just
riverbeds and lakebeds—are trust resources, although the Court of Appeals refused to address the legal
grounds for this concession. 436 P.3d 26, 32 (Or. 2019).
21
The public trust doctrine is perhaps the quintessential background principle of property law that insulates
regulations from compensation requirements. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting
Background Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165, 1183-1204 (2019) (reviewing recent
background principles decisions including those based on the public trust doctrine).
22
Huffman, supra note 2, at 461 (“The navigable rivers and lakes of the vast North American continent made
the modification [the extension of public rights to inland navigable waters] necessary if the doctrine was to
serve the purposes it had in England where navigable waters are almost always tidal waters.”)
23
Id. at 463.
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common law values both stability and evolution, not just the former.24 As the Oregon Supreme Court
once declared:
The very essence of the common law is flexibility and adaptability. It does not consist of
fixed rules but it is the best product of human reason applied to the premises of the ordinary
and extraordinary conditions of life If the common law should become so crystallized …. it
would cease to be the common law of history, and would be an inelastic and arbitrary Code
…. [O]ne of the established principles of the common law [is] that precedents must yield to
the reason of different or modified conditions.25
Jim also objects to the use of private trust law principles to influence public trust
interpretation, because he thinks the fact that the public is both the settlor of the trust and the class
beneficiary makes private trust law inapposite in the public trust world.26

Why public trust

jurisprudence cannot draw upon private trust law without mirroring it precisely, he does not
explain. 27 Instead, he posits that “[t]he trust language of public trust law is better understood as an
expression of the confidence necessarily placed in democratic governance,” and that “there are no
judicial remedies for breach of this public trust,” suggesting without citation to authority that the
only remedies lie in “lobbying, recall, or the next election.”28 This rather astonishing conclusion is
precisely the opposite function that the public trust doctrine serves, which is to question and cabin
democratic decision making in much the same way as the Bill of Rights functions.

As the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed, the public trust—implicit in that state’s constitution’s

24

Jim cites Justice Scalia’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach 510 U.S. 1207
(1994), as if it were law. Huffman, supra note 2, at 465−66.
25
In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086–1087 (1924).
26
Huffman, supra note 2, at 468.
27
Courts regularly look to private trust standards in judging public fiduciary performance. See, e.g.
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d at 932 (Pa. 2017) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 174 in defining the state’s duties as trustee of the people’s
environmental trust to include the duty of care, skill, prudence, loyalty, and impartiality). John Dernbach has
suggested that public trust jurisprudence should look to conservation trust law as well as private trust law.
John C. Dernbach, The Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public Trust Duties for Natural Resources,
54 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569906.
28
Huffman, supra note 2, at 468, 475. See also id. at 474 (“The reference to a trust responsibility must be read
in that political context.”); id. at 475 (“ . . . the concept of trust is political, not legal.”)
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declaration of rights—limits, not reinforces police powers by affirming that the public’s “inherent
and indefeasible rights” predate the constitution itself and are embedded in the social compact
between the citizens and their government.29 In short, public trust rights are inherent in the social
contract; legislative acts cannot rescind these rights.30
There are some other errors in the Huffman comment. He twice claims that the state has
never claimed ownership of the submerged lands of Oswego Lake.31 In truth, as a meandered lake,
the state asserts ownership of at least the lake as meandered in 1852.32 He also alleges that the public
retains no rights in submerged lands once conveyed to private parties.33 His assertion ignored the

29

Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation, 161 A.3d at 930−31 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1)
(adopting analysis of Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (2013)); see also id. at 948
(describing such rights as “of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’”
(quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 25)). Although the Pennsylvania Constitution contains a specific public trust
provision (PA. CONST. art. I, § 27), the Robinson Township and subsequent Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundation opinions make clear that Article 27 created no new rights, but instead enumerated preexisting rights that the people had reserved to themselves in creating government. See id. at 931. Notably,
Article I, section I of the Oregon Constitution secures the same reserved rights of citizens, through its
reservation of “natural rights inherent in people.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides: “Natural rights inherent in
people. (emphasis added) We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right: that
all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority….” The
constitutional force of the public trust doctrine was articulated in the landmark Illinois Central opinion which
declared, “[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested….than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government” Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). As one federal district court observed, “[t]he trust is of such
a nature that it can be held only by the sovereign, and can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.”
United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981). For commentary on the
constitutional underpinnings and force of the public trust principle, see Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger,
The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. POL’Y 281 (2014).
30
See Lake Michigan Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F. Supp. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(“The very purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature's disposition of public lands. If courts
were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, as Loyola advocates, the doctrine would have no teeth.”) Reserved
public property rights to crucial resources remain fundamental to the democratic understandings underlying
all government authority. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Illinois Central, private monopolization of
essential resources “would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.” 146 U.S. at 456.
31
Huffman, supra note 2, at 469−70.
32
Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 446 P.3d 1, 14 (Or. 2019) (“[R]egardless of whether the state could dispose
of the lands under Oswego Lake, the state has not disposed of its interest in those lands.”); see also Kramer
v. City of Lake Oswego, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147310 (dismissing the federal suit because the state’s interest
in the bed of Oswego Lake made it a required party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(a));
see Oregon’s Amphibious PTD, supra note 4, at 11 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1) (2020)).
33
Huffman, supra note 2, at 471.
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rights recognized in cases like Gulliams, which include the public right to engage in “sailing, rowing,
fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city use and …. other
purposes which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated.”34 Surely Guilliams and its
progeny intended to include some rights to use the privately owned subsurface without trespass.35 It
is surprising that Jim would fail to recognize public rights beyond navigation and fishing since his
home state of Montana recognizes both rights of access from uplands and portage rights on private
uplands.36
The Huffman comment concludes with the assertion that the Oswego Lake decision blurred
“the distinction between the state’s police power and public rights,” encouraging “even more political
factions to pursue their interests in the courts.”37 We do not quite know what he means, but he does
claim that the plaintiffs’ motivations were larger than public access to the lake, which, if recognized,
“will be precedent for pursuit of similar claims in other state waters previously understood to be
privately held.”38 What those private waters are, and who recognized them, are left unsaid. Huffman
raises the specter of future cases finding a right of public access over private lands.39 In truth, there
34

Guilliams, 175 P. at 442.
Id. (“To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would
be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.”);
See also Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1936) (“Regardless of the ownership of the bed, the public
has the paramount right to the use of the waters of the lake for the purpose of transportation and commerce.”)
Commerce should be construed broadly to include pleasure-seeking passenger crafts— recreational
watercraft— because Oregon courts consider recreational vessels to be engaged in commerce. Id
36
Public Land Access Ass’n v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Madison County, 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014)
(denying a private landowner the right to impede the public from accessing a privately owned riverbed); Galt
v. State, 713 P.2d 912, 915−16 (Mont. 1987) (noting, however, that public portage rights must be narrowly
construed).
37
Huffman, supra note 2, at 476.
38
Id. at 477.
39
Id. (claiming that such a result would be “a big win for the plaintiffs’ supporters and huge loss for private
property rights;” also claiming that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the public trust doctrine for access “suggests
they have bigger fish to fry” than just access). Huffman suggests that issue of public access to Oswego Lake
could have been resolved in a more straightforward manner under riparian rights law, which will in fact be an
issue on remand. How straightforward that inquiry will be is hardly clear, however, involving questions about
the extent and effectiveness of alleged reservations of private riparian rights in the adjacent public parklands,
35
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is precedent for public access rights in private lands, but the Oswego Lake decision cautioned that
such rights must be narrowly interpreted.40 But the Oswego Lake case was about public access rights
to a publicly owned lake over publicly owned parklands. Imagining that the case was about facts not
in evidence does not serve to clarify the muddy waters that Huffman claims the Oswego Lake
decision created.

and whether private proprietary conveyances can eliminate sovereign rights held in trust for the public.
40
Kramer, 446 P.3d at 10−12 (interpreting Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 447, 450−51 (1869)) (recognizing the
right of a log driver to attach a boom to a privately-owned land on an island in the Tualatin River to facilitate
the log drive).
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